December 20, 2012
The Pergau Dam Affair: Britain's greatest assist scandal
Tim Lankester, the polite menial in assign during the assist for traffic liaison in 1994, has created the revealing book about the liaison that redefined British aid.
by Claire Provost, guardian.co.uk (12-12-12)
Nearly 20 years on, the Pergau Dam Affair stays Britain's greatest aid scandal. Not usually were hundreds of millions of pounds in UK assist linked to the major arms deal, though the plan was deemed hopelessly uneconomic by officials in Britain as well as Malaysia. In late 1994, assist for the plan was spoken unlawful in the turning point case during the UK High Court.
The Guardian ran some-more than 100 articles upon Pergau that year, that dug into the privacy surrounding the event as well as asked how it was possible that so much could have gone wrong.
As the comparison polite menial in assign of UK assist when the liaison broke, Tim Lankester (left) found himself the centre of attention. It was the 1993 National Audi! t Office (NAO) report that remarkable his warding off to pointer off the spending though formal, created instruction from ministers that effectively blew the whistle upon the project. His pierce lifted the question: why had comparison politicians authorized 238m in assist then the largest accede to awarded for the singular plan opposite the advice of polite servants?
Lankester has right away created the fascinating though eye-wateringly expensive book upon the affair. Uncovering forgotten documents as well as reconstructing the twists as well as turns of events, it offers the behind-the-scenes take upon the debate that would redefine British unfamiliar aid.
"We were slipping in this direction for years," he says, describing the "pessimistic" mood between UK assist officials during the time. The assist bill had been slashed, some-more was being destined by general organisations, as well as what was left was increasingly being abused by commercial interests. "Pergau was us drawing the line in the sand," he says.
The UK assist programme during the time was managed by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the department of the Foreign Office. Without its own cupboard minister, the ODA was as well diseased to urge its corner, says Lankester. Meanwhile, the government's controversial aid-for-trade process brought increasing vigour from business, that saw the assist bill as the honey pot.
The end of the cold war had ratcheted up competition in the tellurian arms trade; British firms, along with the tiny people in government, were after any event to boost sales.
The trouble began in 1988 with the secret counterclaim agreement joining the promise of municipal 
aid to Malaysia with the major arms traffic deal. Lankester, during the Treasury then, sent the memo to John Major warning that the linkage could "create strident annoyance to ministers as well as wasteful open output I have tiny doubt that the press will eventually get upon to this".
However, it would take five years for details of the plan to emerge. There were some-more people who knew about Pergau in commercial operation than in Whitehall, says Lankester, while NGOs knew zero prior to the NAO report. He doubts the plan would have gone by had some-more people well well known some-more about it earlier. Lankester cautions opposite only blaming politicians, observant polite servants "gave way as well easily".
Looking back, he admits he had doubts about the legality of the plan as well as should have sought grave authorised advice. He also underestimated the energy of the commercial operation run in Whitehall as well as the Malaysian Prime Minister's own desire to pull by the dam project, he says. On the UK side, he puts much of the event down to the "extremely dominant" Margaret Thatcher, who was well well known to have views upon assist as well as traffic with Malaysia. "It was difficult for ministers to mount up to her."
Lankester visited Pergau for the initial time final summer, as well as contrasts the play of the event with what he found measureless natural beauty as well as the comparatively well-functioning dam. "It does work utterly well, though it came during such the high cost," he says.
The event did leave the tiny certain legacies: the cross-party accord that assist should be strictly "untied" from com! mercial interests, the new action enshrining in law its poverty reduction focus, as well as the cupboard apportion for the new Department for International Development (DfID). Now, when the permanent cabinet member dissents from the spending proposal, parliament is rught away notified.
His book, however, ends with the warning: "It is impossible to contend that something like this will never occur again with British aid."
Revelations that 500m in UK assist is outlayed by the tiny group of, primarily British, consultants lifted questions in September about who benefits as well as who increase from the UK assist programme.
The World Development Movement, that led the authorised challenge opposite assist for the Pergau dam, sounded the alarm as well as pointed to the bequest of Pergau after the former growth cabinet member Andrew Mitchell reportedly linked assist to India with ambitions to sell Typhoon fighter jets final year.
"We only shouldn't go there," Lankester says of joining traffic with aid. It's the message he'll take to DfID this month, where he's presenting his book. "I'm happy for us to spend money in countries where we have traffic relations, though I don't wish any linkage," he says. "It's only as well dangerous. It's the sleazy slope. That's the doctrine of Pergau."
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