July 17, 2012
Asia Times Online: ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Cambodia
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh: Another Perspective
By Donald K Emmerson
Never in 45 years of unchanging meetings steadily followed by bland communiques have a unfamiliar ministers of a Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) unsuccessful to determine upon a have a difference for public consumption summarizing their in isolation deliberations. Not, which is, until now.
At a finish of their just-concluded entertainment in Phnom Penh, a overpower was deafening. The proximate equates to was their inability to strech a accord upon either a have a difference should discuss Scarborough Shoal, a site of a tense stand-off which began in Apr in in in between China as good as a Philippines, whose governments both explain which land underline in a South China Sea. The Philippines wanted to embody such a reference. Cambodia objected. Neither gave in. The "ASEAN way" of accord failed.
The details of what went upon so not long ago during a back of sealed doors in Phnom Penh have been still unclear. The repercussions have been not nonetheless known. But it is not as well early to assume that, for China, a result amounts to an evident victory which could infer gossamer in a longer run.
Cambodia as good as China
The underlying equates to of a relapse deeply implicates Beijing as good as a 
effort! to defe nd a explain to possess exclusive emperor rights over scarcely a entire South China Sea. That explain is embodied in a cryptic nine-dash line upon Chinese maps which calls to mind a gigantic cow's tongue lapping deeply in to a maritime heart of Southeast Asia.
Whatever else a tongue might mean, it denies a overlapping rights of government asserted by Brunei, Malaysia, a Philippines, as good as Vietnam, which together with Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Singapore, as good as Thailand have up a membership of ASEAN.
As a 2012 chair of ASEAN, Cambodia hosted a group's Foreign Ministers in Phnom Penh, as good as would have review out their last communique had there been one. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has never, to my knowledge, endorsed China's explain to a South China Sea. But no ASEAN leader is some-more supportive than he is to China's views as good as demands. By refusing to review a have a difference which mentions Scarborough Shoal, he acted in a demeanour consistent with China's positions upon a government conflict.
In Beijing's view, ASEAN has no business trying to finalise a disputes over a South China Sea, which can usually be settled bilaterally in in in between China as good as any of a 4 Southeast Asian claimants, as good as usually when a time has come for which to occur. In this context, by refusing to issue a communique, Cambodia appears to have done what China would have wanted it to do.
China is Cambodia's largest unfamiliar investor. Beijing has lavished money upon high-profile aid projects in a country, together with paying for a Peace Palace in Phnom Penh where a ASEAN ministers met. Almost immediately prior to a start of an ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in Apr 2012, President Hu Jintao arrived upon a four-day visit, a first by a Chinese carry out of state to Cambodia in 12 years. It is tough to reason which Hu's timing was coincidental.
Beijing had already thanked Cambodia for supporting China's core interests, [1] which arguably embody Ch! ina's ar gumentative explain to many of a South China Sea. And even if China's expression of thankfulness farfetched Cambodia's loyalty, there is no subject which Hun Sen has tried to have use of his country's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012 to keep a South China Sea off a group's agenda.
An spectator might conclude which China has effectively hired a Cambodian government to do a bidding, together with preventing a ASEAN ministers from taking advantage of a corner have a difference upon a South China Sea. China can right away indicate to which failure as proof of a own position: "We're not against ASEAN, but if a group can't even determine upon words in a communique, how can they be approaching to negotiate questions of government over a South China Sea? Leave a have a difference to us, in shared talks usually with a states without check concerned, when a time is finally ripe." Or words to which effect.
In integrity to Beijing as good as Phnom Penh, you do not nonetheless know, if you ever will, a extent to which Manila might have common responsibility for a infighting in irony rapt a Peace Palace. Manila did press for a anxiety to Scarborough Shoal in a communique [2].
Why was it so vital to discuss which incident during sea? Why couldn't a shoal have been to a single side alluded to? Did Hun Sen simply remove his temper, as he has in a past, as good as scuttle a have a difference rsther than than concede upon a wording?
A some-more vicious uncertainty is this: How really bad has a rift in Phnom Penh shop-worn ASEAN's capability to unite a binding regulation ruling state function in a South China Sea?
Coding conduct
In 2002, China as good as a ASEAN states signed a non-binding Declaration upon a Conduct of Parties in a South Ch! ina Sea. Some of ASEAN's leaders hoped to commemorate a document's 10th anniversary this year by drafting, in in between themselves, a binding regulation of conduct. The devise was to finish a charge in time for a ASEAN ministers to have known a breeze during their assembly in Phnom Penh.
The great news is which a breeze regulation exists, although a essence have not been announced. It is apparently not a polished text, but it lists a points that, in ASEAN's common judgment, a last content should make. There is even reason to reason which a breeze includes supplies for a allotment of disputes. If which is true, it will greatfully analysts who doubted which ASEAN would be willing or equates to to go beyond a common pieties: be nice, be helpful, as good as don't have things worse.
It is a parole with which claimants have repeatedly violated a carefree terms of a 2002 request which has rendered so obligatory a need for a regulation which categorically opens a door to enforcement. One can be cautiously speedy in this context which in Phnom Penh, mostly abandoned by reporters focused upon a ministers' kerfuffle, ASEAN did give a breeze regulation to China to review.
The bad news is which a communique noting what a ministers had achieved would expected have referred to their success in scheming a breeze regulation as good as described it as an important step forward. Absent which recognition, a content could long for in limbo, without a clear status as good as exposed to being discharged as a small wish list. Intentionally or not, when Hun Sen cancelled a communique, he prevented ASEAN from publicly as good as prominently validating a breeze as a group's central basis for negotiation.
If China really does want to equivocate being bound by a code, what happened in Phnom Penh evokes divide et impera with Chinese characteristics order ASEAN as good as rule a waves. In integrity to Beijing, however, a single must note which China did not manufacture from blemish a division inside ! ASEAN.
Beijing was frequency responsible for ASEAN's unwillingness or inability either to convince 4 of a own members to concede their claims, or to stop a little of them from creation destabilizing moves upon as good as in a water. Had a 4 first resolved a contradictions in in between their own positions, ASEAN could have presented a a single front in a negotiations with China. [3]
Discussions in in in between ASEAN as good as China upon a breeze regulation have been scheduled for September. Because a breeze is an ASEAN product, those talks will be multilateral in character. If China takes part, it will have to leave a bilateralist welfare during a door. ASEAN's devise is to stick upon China in signing a last content during a subsequent spin of ASEAN-related summits this November.
If a talks for a little reason do not to take place in Cambodia, a summits 
certainly will. In Phnom Penh in November, as fickle as Hun Sen is, things could again go badly. Beijing, however, will consider twice prior to it allows itself to be concerned in nonetheless another public embarrassment of ASEAN, especially in a presence of a unfamiliar heads of state who will have collected for a East Middle East Summit. More likely, in in in between right away as good as then, if China really wishes to impede a code, it will have worked tough in discussions with ASEAN either to carry over a completion or, unwell that, to ensure which a essence have been banal.
If this happens, ASEAN could face a Hobson's choice in November: to admit unwell to co-author a content with China, or to unveil as good as accost a toothless edition. In working out what (not) to do as good as when (not) to do it, China will additionally be seeking during a calendar, meaningful which upon January 1, 2013 Cambodia, ! which is not a claimant, will concede a purpose of ASEAN chair to Brunei, which is.
ASEAN's breeze is unlikely to stay hidden for long. If it does sojourn secret, no a single but a governments without check concerned will be equates to to identify China as a equates to of any changes, together with concessions done to prove Beijing. But if a breeze is circulated in a stream form, as good as China last which changes be made, as good as they have been made, these deviations from a original will eventually be public knowledge. ASEAN's diplomats will risk being charged with having given in to a dragon.
The possibility of this function will depend upon a extent to which Beijing has already been arcane to a drafting of a would-be regulation inside ASEAN, as good as has used such entrance to change a diction to a satisfaction. And if China did not play a purpose in which inner ASEAN process, a Southeast Asian with entrance to a breeze who wishes to stop Beijing's capability to amend it will have an incentive to trickle it.
Compared with summits, lower-level conversations have been reduction expected to attract courtesy as good as raise expectations. A sub-ministerial venue for ASEAN-plus-China discussions of a regulation already exists. In which reduction distinguished context, China might find it simpler to carry over any result it does not like.
If China were to stonewall a code, consigning it to permanent limbo, could ASEAN go forward as good as pointer it all by themselves? Not in an ambience of intramural recrimination such as right away exists. But if a passage of time heals benefaction wounds whilst during a same time eroding ASEAN's patience, which could conceivably occur.
ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity as good as Cooperation in Southeast Middle East offers a precedent. The group's member states initially drafted as good as adopted which request by themselves, prior to mouth-watering China as good as alternative countries to sign. Nearly 20 governments outside Southeast Asi! a, toget her with China, have selected to do so. Beijing would, however, object to being given a fait accompli a text, a pen, as good as a dotted line upon which to pointer especially a single meant to internationalize a South China Sea.
China could nonetheless change a mind. Beijing could confirm to embrace a multilateral bid under ASEAN's aegis to breeze a regulation of carry out ruling state function in a South China Sea. China could even determine to a brawl allotment resource of a little sort. If in 2013, in line with expectations, a Xi-Li twin Xi Jinping as president, Li Keqiang as premier is entirely ensconced in Beijing, a system of administration could feel confident sufficient to spin a "frown diplomacy" [4] upside down, in to a smile.
One ought not reason one's breath watchful for such a conversion, however. As a have a difference of realpolitik, China's leaders will still be tempted to remind ASEAN's leaders of a stark asymmetry in in in between them as good as their largest neighbor.
Size matters
Compare ASEAN's subsequent chair, Brunei Darussalam, with a People's Republic
of China. Ostensibly, in a United Nations General Assembly, they have been equals; any has a single vote. Yet Brunei's population is 0.0003 percent of China's. No consternation China prefers to negotiate with Brunei in a room with usually dual chairs, rsther than than having to face all 10 Southeast Asian claimants in a same room during a same time.
Although a sum population represented by those 10 negotiators would still be (slightly) reduction than half a demographic bulk of China, they would outnumber a lone Chinese shrewd person 10 to one. Variations upon a logic of lack of harmony underpin China's repeatedly stated welfare for separate shared negotiations, as good as usually with any of a 4 ! Southeas t Asian claimants.
But distance bring a own discontents. Throwing a weight around in a South China Sea might good keep lesser states during bay, but it will confirm China's image as a bully. If China wields a geo-economic as good as geopolitical energy as a brief instrument "I'm vast as good as you're not" it will trigger corner pushback in in between Southeast Asians whilst earning their disrespect.
Smart energy in a networked world of high-speed linkages, flows, as good as innovations equates to meaningful when recourse to earthy preponderance is counter-productive. Size does matter, but how it is used matters more. By a justification of Chinese tact regarding a South China Sea, which lesson has not been entirely learned.
Earlier this year, for example, China due which an unofficial (Track II) Eminent Persons as good as Experts Group (EPEG) be formed as good as tasked to discuss a breeze regulation of carry out as good as have appropriate recommendations. China due further which a group comprise 10 individuals, 5 from China as good as a single from any of 5 ASEAN states.
In ASEAN circles, this grant appeared blatantly to spell out an imperial mindset formed upon distance alone: "Because we're big, we're entitled to half a seats upon a EPEG. Because you're small, you'll have to share a alternative half. And, by a way, 5 of your 10 members won't be sitting in a room during all." Or thoughts to which effect.
It is probable which China floated a thought of an EPEG in order to carry over a code. With an EPEG in place, Beijing could check decisions upon a content upon a grounds which a advisory physique had not nonetheless finished a report. With half of a EPEG's members representing China, a inform could be deferred for years.
Reportedly, in subsequent discussions, C! hina has kept a 5 seats whilst agreeing to let ASEAN occupy 10. To reduce Beijing's capability to have use of a advisory physique to upstage as good as prolong a credentials of a code, Southeast Asians have insisted which a EPEG should be convened usually after a traffic of a content with China has already begun. Had a communiqu been released in Phnom Penh, it might have referred to a EPEG. Without it, you can usually assume about a predestine of China's proposal.
Beijing's attempt to carry out half a EPEG shows a toughening of China's line over time. In 2005 an ASEAN-China Eminent Persons Group was established to review ASEAN-China family as good as indicate improvements. That physique met a one-country-one-seat rule: 10 Southeast Asians sat during a list with a single Chinese.
If a EPEG does essentially meet with China occupying a third of a fifteen seats, a 
deliberations will be some-more amenable to Beijing's control, especially if splits in in between a ASEAN states further break their majority. As of July 2012 China appeared reluctant to accept a element of equivalence in in in between states which it had been willing to endorse seven years before.
Few Southeast Asians compensate courtesy to events upon Track II. Some of those who do will be relieved which China has during slightest corroborated down from a bid to disenfranchise half of ASEAN. But if a 10 + 5 regulation is retained, a moral-to-realpolitik shift from 10 + 1 given 2005 will, however modestly, degrade Beijing's legitimacy in foreign-policy circles in Southeast Asia.
Already widespread in a literature upon state function is a thought which a "resource curse" bedevils a political economies of countries which have been rich in oil as good as gas b! ut bad i n governance. Could there be an "amplitude curse" which inclines a world's many populous nation to throw a unmatched weight around? [5]
How much of China's "soft energy deficit" in a eyes of Southeast Asians is a function of a peremptory regime? Will democratization, if it occurs, have China some-more collegial? Or will it magnify a curse of distance by creation it harder for China's currently insulated elite to limit a impact of renouned as good as populist nationalism upon unfamiliar policy?
Whatever a answers to these questions, dual things have been clear: Beijing feels entitled to a South China Sea, as good as which clarity of entitlement boundary a capability to plan soft power.
Consider Beijing's ongoing characterization of a explain to a South China Sea as "indisputable." Is there no a single in a unfamiliar ministry who recognizes how diverting this description is? Whatever a single thinks of a nine-dash line upon China's map, it is, beyond a shadow of a doubt, being disputed. Four ASEAN states have been encountering it, not to discuss a condemnation by others.
Manila has referred to separating those tools of a South China Sea which have been "disputed" from those which have been not. Perhaps Beijing thinks which in describing as "indisputable" a explain to many of a entire sea, it is simply protecting a position. But in a area of soft power, where words matter, China's insistence upon indisputability undermines a case.
The deadlock in Phnom Penh might check a regulation of carry out for a South China Sea. But it might additionally speed a unwillingness of during slightest a little ASEAN states to kowtow to their hulk neighbor, whilst strengthening their incentive to cooperate prudently with outsiders, together with a United States, for a consequence of their own inhabitant as good as regional independence. In a meantime, it behooves a 4 Southeast Asian claimants to have certain which they too, being really much partial of a problem, have been partial of a! solutio n.
Notes:
1. Hu Jintao's visit to strengthen Sino-Cambodian ties: Chinese envoy, Xinhua, ; as good as Robert Sutter as good as Chin-hao Huang, China-Southeast Middle East Relations: Hu Visits Cambodia as South China Sea Simmers, Comparative Connections, May 2012, p 2.
2. Prak Chan Thul as good as Stuart Grudgings, SE Middle East assembly in disarray over sea brawl with China, Reuters, July 13, 2012.
3. The sixth petitioner is Taiwan; a position, during slightest upon a surface, replicates China's. 4. See Emmerson, China's 'frown diplomacy' in Southeast Asia, Middle East Times Online, October 5, 2010.
5. Such logic could be practical to a function of alternative vast countries as well, of course, together with a United States.
Donald K Emmerson heads a Southeast Middle East Forum during Stanford University. His ultimate announcement is "Southeast Asia: Minding a Gap in in in between Democracy as good as Governance," Journal of Democracy (April 2012).
Copyright 2012 Middle East Times Online (Holdings) Ltd
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